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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
000O000 
LISA HARTWIG, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : Case No, 920496-CA 
v. : 
Priority No, 15 
DAVID HARTWIG, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
000O000 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondent accepts Appellant's statement of the case as 
an accurate synopsis of the procedural history of the case. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent (hereinafter "Plaintiff") seeks affirmance of the 
Order Modifying Decree of Divorce and Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law entered June 29, 1992. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Defendant's Statement of the Issues lists numerous sub-
issues which confuse and distort actual issues on appeal. In an 
attempt to clarify those issues, defendant states as follows: 
Appellant, (hereinafter "Defendant") seeks reversal of 
two principle aspects of the Order Modifying the Decree of Divorce; 
1) Defendant's extended summer visitation wherein, commencing in 
the summer of 1993, Defendant shall have summer visitation for two 
three-week periods, continuing until each child reaches age 9. As 
each child turns nine, the visitation shall increase to six weeks 
with two blocks of time, with no blocks of time being longer than 
one month; and 2) the daycare and preschool expenses. 
With regard to the issue of summer visitation, the issue 
presented for appeal is whether the Trial Court's decision is so 
unjust as to represent an abuse of discretion. (See Nilson v. 
Nilson, 652 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1982), Bake v. Bake. 772 P.2d 461 (Utah 
App. 1989), Maughan v. Maucrhan. 770 P.2d 156 (Utah App. 1989). 
With regard to daycare and preschool expenses issue, no 
standard of review has been identified. However, the 
"reasonableness" language in the relevant statute indicates this 
Court should only disturb the decision it if determines the Trial 
Court's abused its discretion. 
Defendant's Objection to the Findings of Fact fails to 
state any specific objection to the Findings as entered by the 
Court. 
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS1 
In addition to the facts set forth in Appellant's brief 
as "relevant Facts" Plaintiff (referred to in transcript as "Mrs. 
Fithian", her married name) adds the following important testimony 
and evidence from the proceedings. 
1
 These abbreviations are used throughout: The record as 
paginated by the District Court Clerk is designated as "R"; The 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, entered by Judge Anne M. 
Stirba, on June 29, 1992 are designated as "Findings"; the Order 
Modifying Decree of Divorce, entered June 29 1992, is designated 
"Order"; the Transcript of the trial proceeding is designated 
"Tr.". 
2 
Although Defendant was regular in his exercise of 
visitation with his children, at the time of trial, the longest 
time he had exercised extended visitation has been nine consecutive 
days, (Tr. at 16 and 57). This occurred when Plaintiff and 
Defendant both resided in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Plaintiff testified that her proposed extended visitation 
schedule (the schedule adopted in the Court's ruling) was based on 
the children's well-being as it related to the Defendant's problem 
with controlling his anger. (Tr. at 30 and 31). Plaintiff also 
testified that, during long term visitation, she actually feared 
for the children's physical well being. (Tr. at 53). The parties 
both related an incident during the summer of 1991 when Defendant 
had visitation of the boys and had a fight with his current wife. 
During the course of the problem with his wife, Defendant returned 
the boys to Plaintiff until his anger subsided. (Tr. at 19 and 
31) . During the marriage, plaintiff was very concerned about 
Defendant's rage. He put a fist through the wall and has put his 
head through a wall. (Tr. at 32 and 33). 
In addition, Plaintiff testified that the stepped up 
visitation schedule she proposed and adopted by the Court, was in 
part based on the children's personalities. (Tr. at 34 and 35). 
The older child, Ben, is verbal and when he is under stress he is 
angry and outspoken. The younger child, Nathan, is more 
introspective and comes back from visitation bed wetting with 
additional aggressive behavior. (Tr. at 35 and 51). The issue of 
breaking up the summer visitation is so important to Plaintiff that 
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she is willing to pay for the transportation for a second, short 
summer visit. (Tr. at 35) . Plaintiff testified that she is fearful 
for both the children's physical and psychological well-being on 
long visitation with the defendant. (Tr at 53). 
On the issue of the reasonableness of the daycare 
expense, Plaintiff testified that while the parties were married 
they had in-home daycare. (Tr. at 28). Plaintiff also testified 
that before she had in-home daycare in California, her work 
schedule necessitated that she drop the children off before school 
for daycare so that the children had supervision before school 
began each morning. (Tr. at 50). Currently, Plaintiff's daycare 
expense is $1,017.50 per month: $752.50 for a full time in-home 
provider, or nanny, and approximately $265 for the youngest child's 
Montessori preschool. (Tr. at 39). Plaintiff further testified 
that the in-home daycare provider she currently employs in 
California arrives at the home between 7:30 and 8:30 in the morning 
and gets the boys ready for school, feeds them breakfast, and gets 
them off to school. The nanny then picks up the children from 
school at the two different times they are out and cares for them 
until Plaintiff gets home from work. The youngest child gets out 
of school at 12:00 p.m. and the eldest child finishes school at 
2:20 p.m. (Tr. at 44). If Plaintiff is later than usual in the 
evening the nanny feeds the children dinner. (Tr. at 38) . The 
nanny transports the children to their numerous after school 
activities, does their laundry and cleans up after them. (Tr. at 
38). The nanny does not do any laundry for other members of the 
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household, nor does she do general housekeeping. (Tr. at 45 and 
46) . 
No evidence was presented that the children's 
grandmother, Mr. Fithian's mother, utilized, nor required any 
services of the in-home daycare provider. (Tr. at 40) . Plaintiff 
also testified that it was not appropriate for the elder Mrs. 
Fithian, at 83 years of age, to be enlisted to perform child care 
services. (Tr. at 43). 
Both parties testified that there had been problems in 
the past with daycare receipts and accounting in terms of what 
would satisfy defendant's need for verification of plaintiff's 
child care expenses. Ultimately, the parties had to go back to 
court to obtain assistance from the Court Commissioner as to what 
constituted appropriate verification. (Tr. at 9, 10 and 41). 
Plaintiff agreed to keep Defendant informed should the cost of her 
daycare increase or decrease, but testified that it would be much 
easier if Defendant were ordered to pay a set amount each month, 
than having to submit verification of daycare expenses to Defendant 
on a monthly basis and potentially have the same types of problems 
arise as the parties had before. (Tr. at 42). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
In order to prevail on appeal, Defendant must establish 
that the Trial Court's Order regarding extended summer visitation 
is a ruling so outrageous as to constitute an abuse of discretion. 
Defendant raises a number of bases for his objection to the Court's 
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ruling; however, the Court's detailed Findings, well supported by 
the evidence clearly establish that Judge Stirba's ruling is in the 
children's best interests and should be upheld, 
POINT II 
Defendant also objects to the Court's ruling that he is 
responsible for one-half of his children's daycare and preschool 
expense• Again, this is an issue wherein the Trial Court may 
exercise considerable discretion• A review of the detailed 
findings establish the reasonableness of the daycare and preschool 
costs and the statute dictates that Defendant is responsible for 
one-half that cost, so long as it is actually incurred. 
POINT III 
Plaintiff should be awarded her attorney's fees and costs 
incurred in defending this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§30-3-3 (1953, as amended). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT FAILS TO ESTABLISH THAT THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION IN THE AWARD OF EXTENDED SUMMER VISITATION. 
Broad discretion is given to the Trial Court in matters 
of child custody and visitation and only when the Court's action is 
flagrantly unjust that it rises to the level of abuse of discretion 
should this court overrule it. (See Nilson v. Nilson, 652 P.2d 
1323 (Utah 1982), Bake v. Bake, 772 P.2d 461 (Utah App. 1989), 
Mauqhan v. Mauqhan, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah App. 1989). 
Furthermore, the overriding consideration in all issues 
of child custody and visitation is the child's best interest. 
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Walker v. Walker, 707 P.2d 110 (Utah 1985), Hoaae v. Hoqqe, 649 
P.2d 751 (Utah 1982). This principle has been codified in Utah 
Code Ann. §30-3-5(4) (1953, as amended) which states, "In 
determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other 
relatives, the Court shall consider the welfare of the child." 
Nonetheless, Defendant seems to take the approach that mathematical 
precision and the annual number of days of visitation he is 
entitled to exercise are more appropriate considerations. 
Defendant's argument is that he should be awarded the same number 
of days of visitation with his children as in the original Decree 
of Divorce, regardless of how this affects his children's best 
interests. Defendant's position fails to acknowledge the primary 
importance of the children's best interests in determining an 
appropriate visitation schedule. 
Defendant objects to Plaintiff's testimony at trial 
regarding Defendant's behavior during the marriage. (Tr. at 32, 33 
and 54). However, this evidence was not objected to at trial and 
cannot be objected to for the first time on appeal. 
Another basis for Defendant's dissatisfaction with the 
Trial Court's visitation ruling is because it is not in conformity 
with the "Standard Visitation Schedule." The "Standard Visitation 
Schedule" referred to and relied on in Defendant's brief is not 
law; it is not derived from either statute or case law. It is a 
schedule defined by the Third District Court Commissioners to 
assist the Court and parties in outlining a visitation schedule. 
Defendant has not and cannot present legal authority to support his 
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position that what he refers to as "Standardized Visitation 
Schedule" should have any bearing on this case whatsoever. 
Defendant also refers to the Court Commissioner's 
Recommendation at Pre-Trial as a relevant factor this Court should 
consider. Pursuant to the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, 
Section 4-903, the recommendation of the Commissioner at Pre-Trial 
is not binding and only a recommendation. Therefore, Defendant's 
reference to the Recommendation of the Commissioner and his 
inclusion of the Minute Entry as addendum "B" in his brief should 
be given little or no weight in the court's review of this appeal. 
Furthermore, Judge Stirba had the benefit of considering, not only 
Commissioner Arnett's recommendation, but also the evidence and 
testimony from the parties themselves in making her Order and 
Findings of Fact. 
Defendant's brief cites a case from Iowa, wherein a 
father was awarded an unspecified length of extended visitation 
with a six year old child in Greece. Defendant argues that if a 
six year old child can travel to Greece, than he should be awarded 
longer extended visitation with his children, ages 5 and 7, who 
reside in a neighboring state. 
This argument highlights the importance of upholding the 
discretion of the Court in making custody and visitation 
determinations. Every child, every custodial parent and every 
visiting parent and their individual situations are different. 
Accordingly, there can be no set rule as to what visitation 
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schedule is appropriate for every 5 and 7 year old child having 
visitation with their father who lives in another state. 
The Trial Court is in the best position to make this 
determination. The cases cited above outlining the broad 
discretion of the Trial Court recognize this. In the instant case, 
the Court appropriately took into consideration the amount of 
extended visitation Defendant had previously spent with the 
children, the ability of Defendant to personally spend extended 
visitation with the children, Defendant's stability in his current 
marriage and the ages and maturity of the children. These 
considerations are appropriately reflected in the court's detailed 
Findings of Fact. All these factors and criteria were considered 
by the Court in light of the children's best interests. 
Accordingly, the Court did not abuse its discretion in establishing 
a summer visitation schedule and its decision should be affirmed. 
In addition, Defendant has failed to marshal the evidence 
in support of the findings in order to attempt to demonstrate that 
those findings are clearly erroneous. This Court wrote in Saunders 
v. Sharp, 806 P. 2d 198, 199 (1991) that, "If the appellant fails to 
marshall the evidence, the appellate court assumes that the record 
supports the findings of the trial court and proceeds to a review 
of the accuracy of the lower court's Conclusions of Law and the 
application of that law in the case." 
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POINT II 
THE CHILD CARE EXPENSE AWARD IS REASONABLE AND APPROPRIATE AND 
DEFENDANT FAILS TO SHOW THAT THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
OR THAT THE AWARD WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
Defendant admits in his brief that there is no standard 
of review defined in Utah Case law for appellate review of a child 
care award, but concedes that the trial court's decision should be 
given great discretion and overruled only if its ruling is found to 
be clearly erroneous. (Appellant's brief at p. 18). A review of 
the court's Findings of Fact indicate that the Trial Court's 
decision is reasonable and well supported by the evidence. 
The Court made detailed Findings on the reasonableness of 
the child care costs. Those Findings of Fact indicate that the 
Court took the following factors into consideration: 
That $752.50 per month is a reasonable amount of 
expense to pay on a monthly basis for in-home child 
care, especially in light of the duties that were 
testified to in Court, namely, getting the children 
ready for school; getting them breakfast; taking 
the children to school; bringing the children home 
from school; providing lunch for the child that 
comes home midday; taking the children to these 
various activities; and, attending to their 
laundry. The Court is aware of what laundry the 
children could generate, and household disarray 
that they could create, taking care of the home 
insofar as it relates to the child care. There is 
not credible evidence otherwise in this Court's 
view that the daycare expense was in part 
attributable to other household duties. All the 
evidence presented to the Court really indicates 
that the child care provider is, in fact, providing 
child care and not providing other household 
duties. Therefore, the Court finds that the child 
care expense of $752.50 per month is reasonable and 
also necessary to provide child care. 
Findings at p. 11. 
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The Court further found "with regard to someone being in 
the home at times when that child is not at home, the Court finds 
that there is not anything unusual about that particular practice 
here, given that fact that person has to be on call in case a child 
is sick or that provides an opportunity of time in which to take 
care of other child-related issues at home. The Court does not 
think that is unreasonable under the circumstances." (Findings at 
p. 12). 
As evidenced by the above Findings, the Court took into 
consideration all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the 
daycare issue including Defendant's concern that there would be 
times when the daycare provider was in the home and the children 
were not. The Court's detailed Findings support her decision that 
$752.50 per month for in-home daycare is reasonable. 
Utah Code Ann. Sections 78-45-7.7 (2) (c) , 78-45-7.8(5) 
and 78-45-7.9(6) (1953, as amended) all indicate that the work-
related child care expense shall be allocated equally to each 
parent. As admitted by the Defendant, there is no formula or ratio 
for the division of child care expenses as they relate to each 
parent's income; child care costs are simply split between the 
parties equally, regardless of income. The issue of any 
consideration of Defendant's second income in arriving at his share 
or percentage of responsibility for daycare expenses is irrelevant 
and totally unsupported by the Uniform Civil Liability for Support 
Act, Utah Code Ann. 78-45-1 et. seq., (1953, as amended). 
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In response to Defendant's objection to paying a set 
amount towards daycare each month, the Court's decision to 
structure the child care award in this manner is supported by its 
Finding that Plaintiff has had great difficulty in collecting the 
work-related daycare expenses. (Findings at p. 13) . In addition, 
there was testimony by both parties that there had been numerous 
accounting problems with daycare expenses in the past. (Tr. p. 9, 
41). In addition, there was no dispute that Plaintiff is actually 
incurring the daycare and Montessori expenses testified to in court 
of $1,017.15 per month. Therefore, the Court's order that 
Defendant pay daycare of a set amount each month, until 
circumstances change is well supported by the testimony presented, 
appropriately documented in its Findings of Fact and not 
unreasonable and certainly not an abuse of discretion or clearly 
erroneous. Defendant continues to be afforded statutory protection 
under Utah Code Ann. 78-45-7.16 (1953, as amended) that provides, 
"If an actual expense included in an amount specified in the order 
ceases to be incurred, the obligor may suspend making monthly 
payments of that expense while it is not being incurred without 
obtaining a modification of the child support order." 
Defendant further objects to the Court's order that no 
ruling was made at this juncture regarding the reasonableness of 
the youngest child's attendance at Montessori first grade. At the 
time of trial this child was attending Montessori pre-school with 
a reasonable monthly expense of $265 per month. The Court made a 
Finding that if this child should attend Montessori first grade, 
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then Defendant's obligation to pay for 1/2 the cost may be brought 
by Order to Show Cause. In fact, contrary to Defendant's portrayal 
of this as shifting the burden to him to show the child should 
continue to attend Montessori, the Court specifically found that if 
the Plaintiff decides to continue Montessori Plaintiff must 
"present justification at that time if she feels it appropriate for 
him to continue to go to a Montessori program and require Defendant 
to pay one-half of the costs thereof". (Findings at p. 10). 
It would be inappropriate for the Court to make a finding 
one way or the other regarding the reasonableness of the child's 
attendance at Montessori in the future. The Court's finding that 
any further dispute regarding Montessori may be brought via Order 
to Show Cause was an attempt on her part to expedite any hearing on 
the matter. 
Defendant's Objection to the Findings of Fact fails to 
state any specific disputed language or provision. The Findings 
were properly reviewed and entered by the judge and should be 
upheld by this Court. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT SHOULD BE AWARDED HER ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
INCURRED BY HER IN THE DEFENSE OF THIS APPEAL. 
Section 30-3-3, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) is the 
statutory basis for an award of attorney's fees in a divorce 
action. It states that: "The Court may order either party to pay to 
the clerk a sum or money . . . to enable such party to prosecute or 
defend the action." Id. 
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This section has been interpreted to apply to attorney's 
fees incurred both at the trial and appellate levels. See Dahlberg 
v. Dahlberq. 77 Utah 157, 292 P. 214 (1930), Carter v. Carter. 584 
P.2d 904 (Utah 1978), and Mauahan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 162, (Utah 
App. 1989). 
Clearly, this statute gives the Court the authority to 
award Plaintiff her attorney's fees to allow her to defend this 
appeal. 
Plaintiff prevailed at the trial level and should 
Defendant's appeal uphold the Trial Court's decision, she is 
certainly entitled to a reimbursement from Defendant for the legal 
fees and expenses she has incurred in defending this action before 
this Court. Furthermore, Defendant is an attorney licensed to 
practice law in the State of Utah and it is believed that he is 
doing much, (if not all) of the work on his own appeal. 
Accordingly, defendant's costs in pursuing this appeal may be much 
less (or none at all), than the costs Plaintiff has been forced to 
incur to defend this action. 
The Court should award Plaintiff all of her attorney's 
fees and costs related to defending this appeal and the matter 
should be remanded to the Trial Court for a determination of the 
amount of the fees and for entry of an appropriate judgment against 
Defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant has chosen to appeal the Trial Court's decision 
in two highly discretionary areas: visitation and day care costs. 
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Defendant alleges that the Court's order of extended summer 
visitation constitutes an abuse of discretion and that the Court's 
Finding that Plaintiff's actually incurred daycare costs are 
reasonable is clearly erroneous. The Trial Court should be 
afforded great discretion in both areas and the Judge's decision 
tampered with, only, if her decision is deemed clearly unjust. In 
this case, the Court heard both party's testify, made detailed 
Findings, well supported by the evidence and, its decision should 
be upheld in all respects. Plaintiff should be awarded all her 
attorney's fees and costs for having to defend this matter. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ Q day of January, 1993. 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
SftSRONATDONOVAN 
SHANNON W. CLARK 
Attorneys for Lisa Hartwig, Plaintiff/ 
Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the Q,C> day of January, 1993, two 
true and correct copies of the above and foregoing Appellee's Reply 
Brief were duly hand delivered, addressed to: 
Kathryn S. Denholm, Esq. 
263 East 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115 
IQAJU-
iARON A. DONOVAN, ESQ. 
SHANNON W. CLARK, ESQ. 
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Salt Lake County Utah 
JUN 2 9 1992 
SHARON A. DONOVAN (0901) / 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
310 South Main, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-6383 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oOo 






DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 894900194 
Judge Anne M. Stirba 
-oOo 
Both parties1 Petitions for Modification of Decree of Divorce 
came on regularly for trial on April 2, 1992, before the Honorable 
Anne M, Stirba, one of the Judges of the above-entitled Court, 
Plaintiff appearing in person and by and through her attorney, 
Sharon A. Donovan, and Defendant appearing in person and by and 
through his attorney, Kathryn S. Denholm, and the Court having 
heard testimony of Plaintiff and Defendant and having received 
documentary evidence, and counsel for the parties having met in 
chambers and having resolved certain visitation issues and 
submitted the issue of summer visitation and amount of day care to 
the Court, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, and 
the Court having made and entered its written Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law herein, 
A-l 0234 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as 
follows: 
1. The Defendant's visitation shall be modified as follows: 
A. Alternate school breaks, not to exceed a one-
month block. 
B. One-half of the Christmas break, with Christmas 
Day to be included in Defendant's visitation period in 
odd-numbered years beginning in 1993, with the further 
provision that the children not be required to travel on 
Christmas Eve or Christmas Day, 
C. In the summer of 1992, Defendant shall have 
both of the children for two two-week blocks. Plaintiff 
shall pay for the round-trip ticket for the second block 
of time for the children, in addition to one-half of two 
other visits throughout the year, as stated in paragraph 
1(G) below. 
Defendant shall notify Plaintiff by May 15, 1992, 
and thereafter by May 1st of each year of the times 
requires for summer visitation. 
D. Commencing in 1993, Defendant shall have summer 
visitation for two three-week periods, and this 
visitation should continue until each child reaches the 
age of nine. As each child turns the age of nine, the 
visitation shall increase to six weeks, with two blocks 
2 
A-? 
of time and with no block of time being longer than one 
month• 
E. One long weekend not to exceed six days only 
during the time the children would not be in school, upon 
reasonable notice. Defendant shall pay for the 
transportation costs for the visit. 
F. Reasonable weekly telephone visitation with the 
parties children on Sunday evenings at 8:00, Salt Lake 
City time, provided that Defendant pay the costs thereof. 
G. Reasonable visitation in the home state of the 
children, upon fourteen days notice, as long as the 
visitation does not interfere with previously scheduled 
activities, i.e., Defendant to transport the children to 
and from any previously planned activities. 
H. The parties shall split the transportation 
costs for Christmas and shall obtain the best fare 
possible, with the parties exchanging the information 
necessary by the deadline necessary in order to obtain 
the cheapest fare. 
I. Defendant shall drop the children off to 
Plaintiff's husband, babysitter or relative. 
2. Defendant should be required to pay an additional $258.75 
per month for day care, until the Montessori, education is 
concluded, for a total of $508.75 per month, commencing in April, 
1992. When the child ceases the Montessori experience, then that 
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will be reduced down by one-half of the total tuition of $265.00 
per month, to $376.25 per month for day care. 
3. Each party shall pay their own attorneys fees incurred 
herein. 
DATED this ff^K^ day of v^y^*—o—, 1992. 
BY THE ^ OURT: 
Approved as to form: 
KATHRYN S. DENHOLM 




Court Judge __— ^  
A-4 
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Salt Lake County Utah 
JUN 2 9 1992 
SHARON A. DONOVAN (0901) '"' 'l^^rfim* 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
310 South Main, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-6383 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oOo 
LISA FITHIAN (HARTWIG), : 
: FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, : CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
v. : 
: Civil No. 894900194 
DAVID HARTWIG, : 
: Judge Anne M. Stirba 
Defendant. : 
oOo 
Both parties1 Petitions for Modification of Decree of Divorce 
came on regularly for trial on April 2, 1992, before the Honorable 
Anne M. Stirba, one of the Judges of the above-entitled Court, 
Plaintiff appearing in person and by and through her attorney, 
Sharon A. Donovan, and Defendant appearing in person and by and 
through his attorney, Kathryn S. Denholm, and the Court having 
heard testimony of Plaintiff and Defendant and having received 
documentary evidence, and counsel for the parties having met in 
chambers and having resolved certain visitation issues and 
submitted the issue of summer visitation and amount of day care to 
the Court, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, does 
now make, adopt and find the following: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that on or about August 22, 1990, a 
Decree of Divorce was entered in this matter, which provided, in 
relevant part, as follows: 
Custody/Visitation, Plaintiff was awarded the 
permanent care, custody and control of the parties' two 
minor children, Benjamin James Hartwig, age 5, born on 
October 17, 1984, and Nathan Meade Hartwig, age 3, born 
on January 19, 1987, subject to specified rights of 
visitation on behalf of Defendant as follows: 
A. Alternate weekends, from Friday at 6:00 p.m. to 
Sunday at 6:00 p.m. 
B. Alternate holidays, with the following 
holidays: New Years Day; Martin Luther King Jr. Day; 
President's Day; Easter; Memorial Day; Independence Day; 
Pioneer Day; Labor Day; Columbus Day; Halloween; 
Veterans1 Day; and Thanksgiving Day. 
C. One evening on the off week from 5:30 p.m. to 
8:30 p.m. 
D. Christmas Day from 6:00 p.m. through December 
26th at 8:00 p.m. 
E. Prior to the children entering school, two one-
week blocks in the summer, with notification by June 15th 
for 1990 and thereafter by May 1st of each year. Once 
the children reach the age of nine, Defendant shall be 
entitl€*d to have the children for six weeks in the 
summer, not to exceed four weeks for one visitation 
block. 
F- Upon the children entering school, one-half of 
the Christmas break and one month in the summer for two 
two-we€ik periods of time. In the event that the children 
are in year-round school, Defendant shall be entitled to 
one-half of all breaks, with no block to exceed two weeks 
at a time and not to exceed one month total on an annual 
basis prior to the children reaching nine years of age, 
or to exceed six weeks total on an annual basis after the 
children reach the age of nine, not to exceed four weeks 
for one visitation block. 
2 
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G. Each Father1s Dayf regardless of whose weekend 
upon which this holiday may fall. 
H. Each Mother's Day will be with the Plaintiff, 
regardless whose weekend upon which this holiday may 
fall. 
I. The afternoon and evening of each child's 
birthday, or one day in the same week as that child's 
birthday as determined by the child. 
J. If Defendant works every weekend as his primary 
job and primary source of income, he shall be entitled to 
one overnight visitation per week on a consistent night 
to be agreed between the parties. At such time as 
Defendant no longer works every weekend as his primary 
job and primary source of income, the other visitation 
provisions provided herein, i.e., alternate weekends, one 
evening on the off week, etc., should be implemented. 
K. The parties shall have equal access to medical, 
school records and other important records for the 
children. Plaintiff shall sign any releases that are 
necessary to allow the children's school to provide 
Defendant with a schedule of all the upcoming school 
activities. In the event any significant school or 
social events occur that are not on the schedule, 
Plaintiff shall provide Defendant reasonable notice in 
advance of those activities. Defendant shall be notified 
of non-routine medical treatment and shall have access to 
the children's medical files. 
L. Each party shall keep the other advised of 
their current address and telephone numbers, as well as 
that same information concerning the children's regular 
care givers. Neither party shall move their residence 
outside Salt Lake County without thirty (30) days prior 
written notice to the other party. 
Child Support. Defendant was ordered to pay a base 
amount of child support in the amount of $140.50 per 
month, per child, for a total of $281.00 per month. In 
addition, Defendant was ordered to pay up to $250.00 per 
month for his one-half portion of the reasonable work-
related day care, and there was a cap of $250.00 for the 
day care expenses, for a total monthly support of 
$531.00, after giving Defendant a credit for medical 
insurance premiums of $50.00 per month for the children. 
Said support was to be paid through the Clerk of the 
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Court, one-half on the 5th and 20th days of each month, 
until the children reach the age of eighteen and graduate 
from high school in their expected senior year. 
2. Since the entry of the Decree of Divorce, the 
circumstances of the parties have materially and substantially 
changed, including, but not limited to the following: 
A. Plaintiff has remarried and at the end of 
August, 1991, moved to the State of California with her 
new husband and the children, where her new husband is 
starting Theology School. Plaintiff's employment in the 
State of Utah was also in the process of being phased 
out. 
B. After the move to California, Plaintiff was 
unemployed for a period of time and is now employed, 
earnincf a gross income of $4,166.00 per month, which is 
less than what she was earning at the time of the entry 
of the Decree of Divorce of $4,468.00 gross per month. 
C. The day care expenses for the children have 
substantially increased and have gone from approximately 
$600.00 per month to $1,017.15, which includes Montessori 
preschool and day care expenses. The overall cost of 
living is also higher in California, with Plaintiff's 
mortgage payment being $1,200.00 per month for a very 
modest home. 
D. Defendant has remarried and his income has 
increased since the entry of the Decree of Divorce. At 
4 
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the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce, his 
income was $1,988.00. His present income is $2,370.00 
per month, and pursuant to Defendants testimony, he also 
earned approximately $5,000.00 in 1991 from his private 
law practice, after business expenses. 
3. The Court finds that the parties have had ongoing 
problems with visitation, but the parties have stipulated to the 
following visitation: 
A. Alternate school breaks, not to exceed a one-
month block. 
B. One-half of the Christmas break, with Christmas 
Day to be included in Defendant's visitation period in 
odd-numbered years beginning in 1993, with the further 
provision that the children not be required to travel on 
Christmas Eve or Christmas Day. 
C. In the summer of 1992, Defendant should have 
both of the children for two two-week blocks. Plaintiff 
should pay for the round-trip ticket for the second block 
of time for the children, in addition to one-half of two 
other visits throughout the year, as stated in paragraph 
3(G) below. 
Defendant should notify Plaintiff by May 15, 1992, 
and thereafter by May 1st of each year of „the times 
requires for summer visitation. 
5 
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D. One long weekend not to exceed six days only 
during the time the children would not be in school, upon 
reasonable notice. Defendant should be ordered to pay 
for the transportation costs for the visit. 
E. Reasonable weekly telephone visitation with the 
parties children on Sunday evenings at 8:00, Salt Lake 
City time, provided that Defendant pay the costs thereof. 
F. Reasonable visitation in the home state of the 
children, upon fourteen days notice, as long as the 
visitation does not interfere with previously scheduled 
activities, i.e., Defendant to transport the children to 
and from any previously planned activities. 
G. The parties should split the transportation 
costs for Christmas and shall obtain the best fare 
possible, with the parties exchanging the information 
necessary by the deadline necessary in order to obtain 
the cheapest fare. 
H, Defendant should drop the children off to 
Plaintiff's husband, babysitter or relative. 
4. The Court further finds, with regard to the summer 
visitation issue, that the non-custodial parent is entitled to 
reasonable visitation, and the Court views visitation issues in 
light of what is in the best interests of the children and in light 
of the non-custodial spouse's parents' entitlement to reasonable 




1992, there may be two two-week periods for both of these children 
and that it seems to be in the best interests of the children and 
reasonable in light of the stipulation of the parties. 
With regard to subsequent years, the Court finds that 
visitation must be set in recognition of the rights of the natural 
parents and what is in the best interests of the children. In 
making such orders, the Court considers the age of the children, 
the relationship of the children to the non-custodial parent, the 
stability of the home environment of the non-custodial parent and 
other issues that pertain to what is in the best interests of the 
children regarding visitation. In the Court's view, age is a 
significant factor, and the ages of the children, Nathan having 
just turned five in January, 1992, and Ben being seven years old at 
this time. 
The Court finds that it is reasonable to change visitation 
during the summer months gradually, rather than making a 
significant change from two two-week periods to all of a sudden a 
volume of a six week period of time, from the four-week period of 
block of time, or even as Defendant has requested, even six weeks 
at a time. After hearing all of the testimony in this matter, the 
Court does not believe that it is in the best interests of these 
children, given their ages and given the fact that they have not 
had the opportunity to have visitation with their father for more 
than one week to ten days at a time to date. 
7 
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Defendant testified that one of the reasons he wanted a larger 
block of time for visitation was due to his work schedule, and he 
also felt that it would benefit the children to be able to spend a 
larger block of time with him and that he would attempt to arrange 
his work schedule. The Court finds, however, that if because of 
his work schedule there were other problems and he were not able to 
fulfill the four-week arrangement, that he would then return the 
children to the natural mother. The Court has some concerns about 
that arrangement in and of itself, because even if Defendant would 
be able to make those kinds of changes, once the children have it 
in their minds and expectation of a certain period, then obviously 
the Court finds it is in the best interests to fulfill that 
expectation so long as there aren't other problems that would 
outweigh that in any particular circumstance. 
Defendant has proposed larger blocks of time because he wants 
to be able to do things with the children, such as take off work 
and do things with them and he felt that longer blocks of time 
would be valuable in and of themselves. The Court has considered 
that issue, as well. The Court has also heard evidence from the 
Plaintiff concerning Defendant's marital situation and the problems 
he experienced in the marriage and arguments that have ensued 
between Defendant and his current wife in front of the children in 
the summer of 1992. This was not disputed by Defendant. 
In light of the ages of the children and their best interests, 




should occur in a gradual fashion and increase in length of time, 
until they reach the age of nine. The Court finds that Plaintiff fs 
proposal is reasonable in this matter, and the Court finds that 
there should be two three-week periods in 1993, and that visitation 
should continue until each child reaches the age of nine. The 
Court finds that as each child turns the age of nine, the 
visitation should increase to six weeks, with two blocks of time 
and with no block of time being longer than one month. The Court 
specifically recommends that there will be a period of time when 
the older child will be staying longer and the younger child would 
come home. The Court finds, however, that a nine year old can 
better handle a longer period of visitation than a seven year old 
could under the same circumstances. The Court finds that it is 
important for the parties to encourage communication with the 
children. 
5. With regard to the day care issue, the Court has 
considered the testimony that has been presented and arguments of 
counsel with regard to this particular issue. The Court finds that 
Defendant has been paying $250.00 per month, which is less than 
one-half of the actual day care costs incurred by Plaintiff when 
she resided in Utah. That was the amount that the parties agreed 
to at the time of the divorce. Plaintifffs day care expenses now 
amount to $1,017.15 per month, with $265.00 going towards payment 
of the Montessori Preschool/day care tuition. The Court believes 
that is a reasonable amount for Montessori tuition. The Court is 
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aware that when Nathan enters kindergarten that the Montessori 
school amount should disappear because when he goes to 
kindergarten, presumably at a public school, that tuition amount 
will no longer apply. It is not clear, based upon the testimony, 
as to when Nathan will go to kindergarten, but when he does, that 
expense should no longer exist. 
The Court finds that if the preschool expense for Montessori 
continues after Nathan enters kindergarten, that issue should be 
reserved by this Court, with Plaintiff to present justification at 
that time if she feels it appropriate for him to continue to go to 
a Montessori program and require Defendant to pay one-half of the 
costs thereof, which may be done by way of Order to Show Cause. 
With regard to the other child care expense, that amount is 
$752.50 according to Plaintiff's testimony. First of all, with 
regard to Plaintiff's mother-in-law who resides with the parties in 
California, the Court is not persuaded that expenses of child care 
represented in Plaintiff's figures covers any expenses for 
Plaintiff's mother-in-law, who is elderly (age 83), but self-
sufficient. There is no credible evidence otherwise, and the Court 
finds that that amount does not pertain to the care, and whatever 
care is attributable in the family, not to the mother-in-law. 
Second of all, with regard to whether the mother-in-law could 
step up and be a child care provider, the Court finds that the 
custodial parent has to have discretion in determining who is to 
care for the children. Obviously, part or some of the functions of 
10 
this child care provider goes to things that the mother-in-law is 
not able to provide, specifically, transporting the children to and 
from Spanish lessons, karate lessons, baseball games, try-out 
practices and that sort of thing, and there may be others. Some 
discussion has to be given to the child care so that it is apparent 
who is best able to provide appropriate chid care. In this 
particular circumstance, the Court is satisfied that there has not 
been an unreasonable decision in not choosing the mother-in-law to 
care for the children, but that that person could look to outside 
care. 
The Court finds that $752.50 per month is a reasonable amount 
of expense to pay on a monthly basis for in-home child care, 
especially in light of the duties that were testified to in Court, 
namely, getting the children ready for school; getting them 
breakfast; taking the children to school; bringing the children 
home from school; providing lunch for the child that comes home 
midday; taking the children to these various activities; and 
attending to their laundry. The Court is aware of what laundry the 
children could generate, and household disarray that they could 
create, taking care of the home insofar as it relates to the child 
care. There is no credible evidence otherwise in this Court's view 
that the day care expense was in part attributable to other 
household duties. All of the evidence that has been presented to 
the Court really indicates that the child care provider is, in 




duties. Therefore, The Court finds that the child care expense of 
$752.50 per month is reasonable and also necessary to provide child 
care. The Court finds that that covers everything with regard to 
the child care expense. 
Accordingly, the testimony of Defendant was that it would be 
difficult for him to come up with the extra money, but the Court is 
satisfied that there is an ability to pay, to contribute the 
additional amounts towards child care expense. The Court finds 
that $1,117.50 is a reasonable amount of total monthly child care 
under the circumstances and for the reasons indicated previously, 
and therefore, until the Montessori education is concluded, 
Defendant should be required to pay an additional $258.75 per 
month, for a total of $508.75 per month, which is half of that 
amount for day care, to commence with the month of April, 1992. 
When the child ceases the Montessori experience, then that will be 
reduced down by one-half of the total tuition of $265.00, or a 
reduction to $376.25 per month for day care. 
With regard to someone being in the home at times when the 
child is not at home, the Court finds that there is not anything 
unusual about that particular practice here, given the fact that 
that person has to be on call in case a child is sick or that 
provides an opportunity of time in which to take care of other 
child-related issues at home. The Court does not,, think that is 
unreasonable under the circumstances. This again may change when 
the children are in school full-time. The Court finds that there 
12 
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will have to be a re-evaluation of this at that time because 
presumably the child care expense would be substantially affected 
by having two children in school full-time- There is no evidence 
before the Court on which to rule on that particular issue now. 
6. The Court finds that Plaintiff has had great difficulty 
in collecting the work-related day care expenses. 
7. The Court further finds that the parties have agreed that 
they should each pay their own attorney's fees incurred herein. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and 
adopts its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Defendant's visitation shall be modified as follows: 
A. Alternate school breaks, not to exceed a one-
month block. 
B. One-half of the Christmas break, with Christmas 
Day to be included in Defendant's visitation period in 
odd-numbered years beginning in 1993, with the further 
provision that the children not be required to travel on 
Christmas Eve or Christmas Day. 
C. In the summer of 1992, Defendant shall have 
both of the children for two two-week blocks. Plaintiff 
shall pay for the round-trip ticket for the second block 
of time for the children, in addition to one-half of two 
other visits throughout the year, as stated in paragraph 
1(G) below. 
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Defendant shall notify Plaintiff by May 15, 1992, 
and thereafter by May 1st of each year of the times 
requires for summer visitation. 
D. Commencing in 1993, Defendant shall have summer 
visitation for two three-week periods, and this 
visitation should continue until each child reaches the 
age of nine. As each child turns the age of nine, the 
visitation shall increase to six weeks, with two blocks 
of time and with no block of time being longer than one 
month. 
E. One long weekend not to exceed six days only 
during the time the children would not be in school, upon 
reasonable notice. Defendant shall pay for the 
transportation costs for the visit. 
F. Reasonable weekly telephone visitation with the 
parties children on Sunday evenings at 8:00, Salt Lake 
City time, provided that Defendant pay the costs thereof. 
G. Reasonable visitation in the home state of the 
children, upon fourteen days notice, as long as the 
visitation does not interfere with previously scheduled 
activities, i.e., Defendant to transport the children to 
and from any previously planned activities. 
H. The parties shall split the transportation 
costs for Christmas and shall obtain the best fare 
possible, with the parties exchanging the information 
14 
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necessary by the deadline necessary in order to obtain 
the cheapest fare. 
I. Defendant shall drop the children off to 
Plaintiff's husband, babysitter or relative. 
2. Defendant should be required to pay an additional $258.75 
per month for day care, until the Montessori education is 
concluded, for a total of $508.75 per month, commencing in April, 
1992. When the child ceases the Montessori experience, then that 
will be reduced down by one-half of the total tuition of $265.00 
per month, to $376.25 per month for day care. 
3. Each party shall pay their own attorney's fees incurred 
herein. 
DATED this day of V^ O^ws-Q , 1992. 
Approved as to form: 
BY THE COURT: 
ANNE M. STIRBA 
District Couct—CQidge 
KATHRYN S. DENHOLM 
Attorney for Defendant 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the of Mayf 1992, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Kathryn Schuler Denholm 
Attorney at Law 
263 East 2100 South 
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f Clerk of the Court 
UTAH STATUTES CITED 
(h) irreconcilable differences of the marriage; 
(i) incurable insanity; or 
(j) when the husband and wife have lived sepa-
rately under a decree of separate maintenance of 
any state for three consecutive years without co-
habitation. 
4) A decree of divorce granted under Subsection 
3'<j) does not affect the liability of either party under 
any provision for separate maintenance previously 
granted. 
•5) (a) A divorce may not be granted on the 
grounds of insanity unless: (i) the defendant has 
been adjudged insane by the appropriate authori-
ties of this or another state prior to the com-
mencement of the action; and (ii) the court finds 
by the testimony of competent witnesses that the 
insanity of the defendant is incurable. 
(b) The court shall appoint for the defendant a 
guardian ad litem, who shall protect the interests 
of the defendant. A copy of the summons and 
complaint shall be served on the defendant in 
person or by publication, as provided by the laws 
of this state in other actions for divorce, or upon 
his guardian ad litem, and upon the county attor-
ney for the county where the action is prosecuted. 
(c) The county attorney shall investigate the 
merits of the case and if the defendant resides out 
of this state, take depositions as necessary, at-
tend the proceedings, and make a defense as is 
just to protect the rights of the defendant and the 
interests of the state. 
(d) In all actions the court and judge have ju-
risdiction over the payment of alimony, the dis-
tribution of property, and the custody and main-
tenance of minor children, as the courts and 
judges possess in other actions for divorce. 
(e) The plaintiff or defendant may. if the de-
fendant resides in this state, upon notice, have 
the defendant brought into the court at trial, or 
have an examination of the defendant by two or 
more competent physicians, to determine the 
mental condition of the defendant. For this pur-
pose either party may have leave from the court 
to enter any asylum or institution where the de-
fendant may be confined. The costs of court in 
this action shall be apportioned by the court. 1987 
30-3-2. Right of h u s b a n d to divorce. 
The husband may in all cases obtain a divorce from 
his wife for the same causes and in the same manner 
as the wife mav obtain a divorce from her husband. 
1953 
30-3-3. T e m p o r a r y al imony and suit money. 
The court may order either party to pay to the clerk 
a sum of money for the separate support and mainte-
nance of the adverse party and the children, and to 
enable such partv to prosecute or defend the action. 
1953 
30-3-4. P l e a d i n g s — Find ings - Decree - - Seal-
ing. 
(1) (a) The complaint shall be in writing and 
signed by the plaintiff or plaintiffs attorney. 
(b) A decree of divorce may not be granted 
upon default or otherwise except upon legal evi-
dence taken in the cause. 
(c) If the plaintiff and the defendant have a 
child or children and the plaintiff has filed an 
action in the judicial district as defined in Sec-
tion 78-1-2.1 where the pilot program shall be 
administered, a decree of divorce may not be 
granted until both parties have attended, a man-
datory course provided in Section 30-3-11.3 and 
have presented a certificate of course completion 
to the court. The court may waive this require-
ment, on its own motion or on the motion of one 
of the parties, if it determines course attendance 
and completion are not necessary, appropriate, 
feasible, or in the best interest of the parties. 
(d» All hearings and trials for divorce shall be 
held before the court or the court commissioner 
as provided by Section 78-3-31 and rules of the 
Judicial Council. The court or the commissioner 
in all divorce cases shall make and file findings 
and decree upon the evidence. 
{2) The file, except the decree of divorce, may be 
sealed by order of the court upon the motion of either 
party. The sealed portion of the file is available to the 
public only upon an order of the court. The concerned 
parties, the attorneys of record or attorney filing a 
notice of appearance in the action, the Office of Re-
covery Services if a party to the proceedings has ap-
plied for or is receiving public assistance, or the court 
have full access to the entire record. This sealing does 
not apply to subsequent filings to enforce or amend 
the decree. 1992 
30-3-4.1 to 30-3-4 4. Repealed.
 1990 
30-3-5. Disposition of p roper ty — Maintenance 
and hea l th c a r e of par t ies and children 
— Division of deb t s — Court to have 
cont inuing jur isdic t ion — Custody and 
visitation — Termina t ion of al imony — 
Nonmeri tor ious petition for modifica-
tion. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court 
may include in it equitable orders relating to the chil-
dren, property, debts or obligations, and parties. The 
court shall include the following in every decree of 
divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the 
payment of reasonable and necessary medical 
and dental expenses of the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is available at a reasonable 
cost, an order requiring the purchase and main-
tenance of appropriate health, hospital, and den-
tal care insurance for the dependent children; 
and 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is re-
sponsible for the payment of joint debts, obli-
gations, or liabilities of the parties con-
tracted or incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify 
respective creditors or obligees, regarding 
the court's division of debts, obligations, or 
liabilities and regarding the parties' sepa-
rate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of 
these orders. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining 
child support, an order assigning financial responsi-
bility for all or a portion of child care expenses in-
curred on behalf of the dependent children, necessi-
tated by the employment or training of the custodial 
parent. If the court determines that the circum-
stances are appropriate and that th« dependent chil-
dren would be adequately cared for, it may include an 
order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide the 
day care for the dependent children, necessitated by 
the employment or training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make 
subsequent changes or new orders for the support and 
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maintenance of the parties, n • ;-t.niv „» \\t . \ 
dren and their support, maintenance, health, ai-d 
dental care, or the distribution of the property aiid 
obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessarv 
(4) In determining visitation rights of parents 
grandparents, and other relatives the c*»urt --• ' ! 
consider the welfare of the child 
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically prowdVs 
otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay 
alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates 
upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, 
if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab 
initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the party 
paying alimony is made a party to the action of an-
nulment and his rights are determined. 
(6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony 
to a former spouse terminates upon establishment by 
the party paying alimony that the former spouse is 
residing with a person of the opposite sex. However, if 
it is further established by the person receiving ali-
mony that that relationship or association is without 
any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume. 
(7) When a petition for modification of child cus-
tody or visitation provisions of a court order is made 
and denied, the court may order the petitioner to pay 
the reasonable attorney's fees expended by the pre-
vailing party in that action, if the court determines 
that the petition was without merit and not asserted 
in good faith. 1991 
30-3-5 1 Pi c> v is ion for income v<: • :- I-.-JJ.. • . 
child support o rder . 
Whenever a court enters an order for child suppM i. 
it shall include in the order a provision for withhold-
ing income as a means of collecting child support as 
provided in Title 78, Chapter 45d. 1985 
30-3-5.2. Al legat ions of child abuse or child sex 
ual a b u s e — Invest igat ion. 
When, in any divorce proceeding or upon a request 
for modification of a divorce decree, an allegation of 
child abuse or child sexual abuse is made, implicating 
either party, the court shall order that an. investiga-
tion be conducted by the Division of Family Services 
within the Department of Human Services in accor-
dance with Title 62A. Chapter 4, Part 5. A final 
award of custody or visitation may not be rendered 
until a report on that investigation is received by the 
court. That investigation shall be conducted by the 
Division of Family Services within 30 days of the 
court's notice and request for an investigation. In re-
viewing this report, the court shall comply with Sec-
tion 78-7-9. I***" 
30-3-5.5. i v m i o n to protect abused child -hi 
risdiction under this chapter. 
(1) A person who has filed a complaint under t>,i 
chapter may also file a petition with the district couit 
for a protective order for the protection of any chil 
dren residing with either party to the action under 
this chapter. The petition and procedures shall be the 
same as for the issuance of protective orders in the 
juvenile court under Sections 78-3a-20.5, 78-3a-20.6, 
78-3a-20.7, 78-3a-20.8, 78-3a-20.9, and 78-3a-20.10. 
The court or the cohabitant may use the protections 
provided in this chapter and Title 78, Chapter 3a, 
Juvenile Courts, and when necessary, those protec-
tions under Title 76, Chapter 5, Offenses Against the 
Person, which provide for criminal prosecution. 
(2) A person who has obtained, a protective ord*-
pertaining to the same family member nanv-i 
protective oid.-r jy-
30-3-«*» K e p t - i l e d . w -
to-.*t / n IM ii decree becomes absolut* 
1 * The decree of divorce becomes absolute 
fa i on the date it is signed by the court ar. 
entered by the clerk in the register of actions it 
both the parties who have a child or children and 
the plaintiff has filed an action in the judicial 
district as defined in Section 78-1-2.1 where the 
pilot program is administered and have com-
pleted attendance at the mandatory course pro-
vided in Section 30-3-11.3 except if the court 
waives the requirement, on its own motion or on 
the motion of one of the parties, upon determina-
tion that course attendance and completion are 
not necessary, appropriate, feasible, or in the 
best interest of the parties; 
(b) at the expiration of a period of time the 
court, may specifically designate, unless an ap-
peal or other proceedings for review are pending; 
or 
(c) when the court, before the decree becomes 
absolute, for sufficient cause otherwise orders. 
(2) The court, upon application or on its own mo-
tion for good cause shown, may waive, alter, or ex-
tend a designated period of time before the decree 
becomes absolute, but not to exceed six months from 
the signing and entry of the decree. 199-2 
30-3-8. Remarr iage — When unlawful, 
Neither party to a divorce proceeding which dis-
solves their marriage by decree may marry any per-
son other than the spouse from whom the divorce was 
granted until it becomes absolute. If an appeal is 
taken, the divorce is not absolute until after affir-
mance of the decree. isss 
30-3-9. Repealed. 1969 
30 3 10. Custody of child* »-n in i-ast- ot separa-
tion or d i \o ro r < us tod\ consider-
ation. 
(1) If a husband and wife having minor children 
are separated, or their marriage is declared void or 
dissolved, the court shall make an order for the future 
care and custody of the minor children as it considers 
appropriate. In determining custody, the court shall 
consider the best interests of the child and the past 
conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each -v 
the parties. The court may inquire of the children u 
take into consideration the children's desires reg.tr • 
:;.\r th** future custody, but the expressed desires a:-
r.*.i • -ntrolling and the court may determine tht- chr 
custody otherwise. 
.1 awarding custody, the court shall cor : 
o:her factors the court finds relevant, w:x 
- * '. is most likely to act in the best interests of th* 
including allowing the child frequent and con 
Liiiunig contact with the noncustodial parent as tht 
court finds appropriate * ^  
30-3-10.1. Joint legal custody defined 
In this chapter, "joint legal custody": 
(1) means the sharing of the rights, privileges, 
duties, and powers of a parent by both parents, 
where specified; 
(2) may include an award of exclusive author-
ity Kv the court, to one parent to make specific 
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78-44-39. Duties under prior law — Property to 
be included in initial report. 
(1) This chapter does not relieve a holder of a duty 
to report, pay, or deliver property arising before July 
1, 1983. Such holder who fails to comply before that 
date is subject to the applicable enforcement and pen-
alty provisions in existence at that time and those 
provisions are continued in effect for the purpose of 
this subsection, subject to Subsection 78-44-30(2). 
(2) The initial report to be filed under this chapter 
for property that was not required to be reported be-
fore July 1, 1983, but which is subject to this chapter 
shall include all items of property that would have 
been presumed abandoned during the ten-year period 
prior to July 1, 1983, as if this chapter had been in 
effect during that period. 1983 
78-44-40^ 'Applicat ion and cons t ruc t ion of chap-
ter. 
This chapter shall be applied and construed as to 
effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the 
law with respect to the subject of this chapter among 
states enacting it. 1983 
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78-45-1. Shor t title. 
This act may be cited as the Uniform Civil Liabih" 
for Support Act. is-" 
78-45-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(D "Adjusted gross income" means income ca.-
culated under Subsection 78-45-7.6(1). 
(2* "Base child support award" means thr 
award calculated using the guidelines before ad-
ditions for uninsured medical expenses ar.: 
work-related child care costs. 
(3> "Base combined child support obligation ta-
ble."* "child support table," or "table" means t r r 
table in Section 78-45-7.14. 
(4* "Child" means a son or daughter younger 
than 18 years of age and a son or daughter of ar.;. 
age who is incapacitated from earning a l:\.r.g 
and is without sufficient means. 
(5) "Earnings" means compensation paid :r 
payable for personal services, whether denorr..-
nated as wages, salary, commission, bonus, or 
otherwise, and specifically includes periodic pay -
ment pursuant to pension or retirement pro-
grams, or insurance policies of any type. Earn-
ings specifically includes all gain derived iror 
capital, from labor, or from both combined, in-
cluding profit gained through sale or conversion 
of capital assets. 
(6» "Guidelines" means the child suppon. 
guidelines in Sections 78-45-7.2 through 
78-45-7.18. 
(7) "Joint physical custody" means the chile 
stays with each parent overnight for more than 
25% of the year, and both parents contribute to 
the expenses of the child in addition to paying 
child support. 
(8> "Obligee" means any person to whom .. 
duty of support is owed. 
(9» "Obligor" means any person owing a dut> 
of support. 
(10) "Parent" includes a natural parent, an 
adoptive parent, or a stepparent. 
(11) "Split custody" means that each pareni 
has physical custody of at least one of the chil-
dren. 
(12) "State" includes any state, territory, or 
possession of the United States, the District of 
Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto 
Rico. 
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the in-
come shall be based upon employment potential 
and probable earnings as derived from work his-
tory, occupation qualifications, and prevailing 
earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in 
the community. 
<c) If a parent has no recent work history, in-
come shall be imputed at least at the federal min-
imum wage for a 40-hour work week. To impute 
a greater income, the judge in a judicial proceed-
ing or the presiding officer in an administrative 
proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as 
to the evidentiary basis for the imputation. 
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the 
following conditions exist: 
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for 
the parents' minor children approach or 
equal the amount of income the custodial 
parent can earn, 
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally dis-
abled to the extent he cannot earn minimum 
wage; 
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occu-
pational training to establish basic job skills; 
or 
uv) unusual emotional or physical needs 
of a child require the custodial parent's pres-
ence in the home 
<8» ;a> Gross income may not include the earnings 
of a child who is the subject of a child support 
award, nor benefits to a child in the child's own 
right, such as Supplemental Security Income. 
<b» Social Security benefits received by a child 
due to the earnings of a parent may be credited 
as child support to the parent upon whose earn-
ing record it is based, by crediting the amount 
against the potential obligation of that parent. 
Other unearned income of a child may be consid-
ered as income to a parent depending upon the 
circumstances of each case. 1990 
78-45-7.6. Adjusted gross income. 
1) As used in the guidelines, "adjusted gross in-
come" is the amount calculated by subtracting from 
gross income alimony previously ordered and paid 
and child support previously ordered. 
•2) The guidelines do not reduce the total child 
support award by adjusting the gross incomes of the 
parents for alimony ordered in the pending proceed-
ing. In establishing alimony, the court shall consider 
that in determining the child support, the guidelines 
do not provide a deduction from gross income for ali-
mony 1989 
78-45-7.7. Calculation of obligations. 
'1) The parents' child support obligation shall be 
divided between them in proportion to their adjusted 
HTOSS incomes. 
<2) Except in cases of joint physical custody and 
split custody as defined in Section 78-45-2, the total 
child support award shall be determined as follows: 
(a) Combine the adjusted gross incomes of the 
parents and determine the base combined child 
suppoit obligation using the base child support 
obligation table. 
(b) Calculate each parent's proportionate 
share of the base combined child support obliga-
tion by multiplying the combined child support 
obligation by each parent's percentage of com-
bined adjusted gross income, and subtracting 
from the products the children's portion of any 
monthly payments made directly by each parent 
for medical and dental insurance premiums 
(c) Allocate monthly work-related child care 
costs equally to each parent. 
(d) Calculate the total child support award by 
adding the noncustodial parent's share of the 
base child support obligation calculated in Sub-
section (2Kb) and the amount allocated in Sub-
section (2)(c). Include in the order both amounts 
and the total child support award. 
(3) The base combined child support obligation ta-
ble provides combined child support obligations for up 
to ten children. For more than ten children, addi-
tional amounts shall be added to the base child sup-
port obligation shown. The amount shown on the ta-
ble is the support amount for the total number of 
children, not an amount per child. 1990 
78-45-7.8. Split custody — Obligation calcula-
tions. 
In cases of split custody, the total child support 
award shall be determined as follows: 
< 1) Combine the adjusted gross incomes of the 
parents and determine the base combined child 
support obligation using the base child support 
obligation table. Allocate a portion of the calcu-
lated amount between the parents in proportion 
to the number of children for whom each parent 
has physical custody. The amounts so calculated 
are a tentative base child support obligation due 
each parent from the other parent for support of 
the child or children for whom each parent has 
physical custody. 
(2> Multiply the tentative base child support 
obligation due each parent by the percentage 
that the other parent's adjusted gross income 
bears to the total combined adjusted gross income 
of both parents. 
*3) Subtract from the products in Subsection 
(2/ the children's portion of any monthly pay-
ments made directly by each parent for medical 
and dental insurance premiums. 
(4) Subtract the lesser amount in Subsection 
(3) from the larger amount to determine the base 
child support award to be paid by the parent with 
the greater financial obligation. 
(5) Allocate combined monthly work-related 
child care costs equally to each parent. 
(6) Calculate the total child support award by 
adding the base child support award calculated 
in Subsection (4) and the amount allocated in 
Subsection (5). Include both amounts and the 
total child support award in the child^support 
order. ^ 1990 
78-45-7.9. Joint physical custody — Obligation 
calculations. 
In cases of joint physical custody, the total child 
support award shall be determined as follows: 
(1) Combine the adjusted gross incomes of the 
parents and determine the base combined child 
support obligation using the base child support 
obligation table. 
(2) Calculate each parent's proportionate 
share of the base combined child support obliga-
tion by multiplying the combined child support 
obligation by each parent's percentage of com-
bined adjusted gross income. The amounts so cal-
culated are a tentative base child support obliga-
tion due from each parent for support of the chil-
dren. 
78-45-7.10 JUDICIAL CODE 414 
(3) Multiply each parent's tentative base child 
support obligation by the percentage of time the 
children spend with the other parent to deter-
mine each parent's tentative obligation to the 
other parent. 
(4) Subtract from the products in Subsection 
(3) the children's portion of any monthly pay-
ments made directly by each parent for medical 
and dental insurance premiums. 
(5) Calculate the base child support award to 
be paid by the obligor by subtracting the lesser 
amount calculated in Subsection (4) from the 
larger amount. 
(6) Allocate the combined work-related child 
care costs of the parents equally to each parent to 
obtain the other parent's tentative child care ob-
ligation. 
(7) (a) Calculate the total child support award 
that the parent determined to be the obligor 
in Subsection (5) must pay when the obligee 
has physical custody by: 
(i) adding the base child support 
award calculated under Subsection (5); 
and 
(ii) adding the amount of the child 
care obligation allocated to the obligor 
in Subsection (6). 
(b) Calculate the total child support award 
that the parent determined to be the obligor 
in Subsection (5) must pay when that parent 
has physical custody by: 
(i) adding the base child support 
award calculated under Subsection (5), 
and 
(ii) subtracting the amount of the 
child care obligation allocated to the ob-
ligee in Subsection (6). 
(8) Include the amounts determined in Subsec-
tions (7)(a) and (b) and the two total child support 
awards m the child support order. 1990 
78-45-7.10. Reduct ion w h e n child becomes 18. 
(1) When a child becomes 18 years of age the base 
combined child support award is automatically re-
duced to reflect the lower base combined child sup-
port obligation shown in the table for the remaining 
number of children due child support, unless other-
wise provided in the child support order. 
(2) The award may not be reduced by a per child 
amount derived from the base child support award 
originally ordered. 1989 
78-45-7.11. Reduction for ex tended visitation. 
<1) The child support order shall provide that the 
base child support award be reduced by 50% for each 
child for time periods during which the order grants 
specific extended visitation for that child for at least 
25 of any 30 consecutive days. Only the base child 
support award is affected by the 50% abatement. The 
amount to be paid for work-related child care costs 
may be suspended if the costs are not incurred during 
the extended visitation 
(2) For purposes of this section the per child 
amount to which the abatement applies shall be cal-
culated by dividing the base child support award by 
the number of children included in the award. 1990 
78-45-7.12. Income in excess of tables. 
If the combined adjusted gross income exceeds the 
highest level specified in the table, an appropriate 
and just child support amount may be ordered, but 
the amount ordered may not be less than the highest 
level specified in the table for the number of children 
due support. 1939 
78-45-7.13. Advisory committee — Membership 
and functions. 
(1) On or before May 1, 1989 and May 1, 1991. and 
then on or before May 1 of every fourth year subse-
quently, the governor shall appoint an advisory com-
mittee consisting of: 
(a) two representatives recommended by the 
Office of Recover>* Services; 
(b) two representatives recommended by the 
Judicial Council; 
(c) two representatives recommended by the 
Utah State Bar Association; and 
(d) an uneven number of additional persons, 
not to exceed five, who represent diverse inter-
ests related to child support issues, as the gover-
nor may consider appropriate. However, none of 
the individuals appointed under this subsection 
may be members of the Utah State Bar Associa-
tion. 
(2) (a) The advisory committee shall review the 
child support guidelines to ensure their applica-
tion results in the determination of appropriate 
child support award amounts. 
(b) The committee shall report to the Legisla-
tive Judiciary Interim Committee on or before 
October 1 in 1989 and 1991, and then on or be-
fore October 1 of every fourth year subsequenth 
(c) The committee's report shall include recom-
mendations of the majority of the committee, as 
well as specific recommendations of individual 
members of the committee. 
(3) The committee members serve without compen-
sation. Staff for the committee shall be provided from 
the existing budgets of the Department of Human 
Services and the Judicial Council. The committee 
ceases to exist no later than the date the subsequent 
committee under this section is appointed. 1990 
78-45-7.14. Child suppor t obligation table . 
The following is the Base Combined Child Support 
Obligation Table: 
BASE COMBINED CHILD SUPPORT 
OBLIGATION 
(Both Parents) 
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Monthh 
C-^mbineo 














. »H)0 176 
1 u50 17* 
: :oo i8i 
. 150 183 
1 2o0 184 
1 250 165 
1 300 19o 
1 350 195 
. - *> 2CK< 
. -50 205 
. -<>0 210 
-50 215 
i *no 219 
1 o30 224 
" *0 229 
. "V> 234 
I ^ O 239 
i -50 252 
1 svO 256 
1 rSO 259 
2<-0 262 
2 loO 265 
i 2<"«» 267 
2 3«.«J 2"5 





4 5 6 
2 >«J 
3«--J 330 
^ 1"0 339 
12** 343 
3 3«' 357 
3 4o0 366 
3 500 375 
3 6-\» 384 
3 7C-J 393 
3 ^  *"> 402 
J9"J 4I9 
4 0f^ 427 
4 100 435 
4 2C- 443 
i 3v> 451 
4 4X 459 
4 >00 477 
4 *u0 485 
4 70>» 493 
4 SvO 501 
4 900 509 
5 000 517 
5100 525 
5 200 534 
5 300 564 
5 400 570 
5 500 577 
5 600 583 
5 700 590 
5 500 596 
5 900 603 
6o00 609 
6100 616 
6 200 622 
6 300 630 










































































































































































































































































































1,006 1 109 
1,036 1.142 
1,060 1.166 
1,082 1 190 
1,103 1.214 
1,125 1.235 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































78-45-7.15. Medical and denta l expenses — In-
su rance . 
(1) Only the costs of health and dental insurance 
premiums for children are included in the base com-
bined child support obligation table. 
(2) Uninsured medical and dental expenses are not 
included in the table. The child support order shall 
require: 
(a) the custodial parent to pay uninsured rou-
tine medical and dental expenses, including rou-
tine office visits, physical examinations, and im-
munizations; and 
(b) both parents to share all other reasonable 
and necessary uninsured medical and dental ex-
penses in a ratio to be determined by the appro-
priate court or administrative agency. 
(3) (a) If health insurance is available to both par-
ents at a reasonable cost and the children would 
gain more complete coverage by doing so, both 
parents shall be ordered to maintain insurance 
for the dependent children. 
(b) If insurance is not available to both parents 
at a reasonable cost or if no advantage to the 
children's coverage would result, the parent who 
can obtain the most favorable coverage shall be 
ordered to maintain that insurance. 1990 
78-45-7.16. Child ca r e expenses — Expenses not 
incur red . 
(1) The monthly amount to be paid for reasonable 
work-related child care costs actually incurred on be-
half of the dependent children of the parents shall be 
specified as a separate monthly amount in the order. 
(2) If an actual expense included in an amount 
specified in the order ceases to be incurred, the obli-
gor may suspend making monthly payment of tha t 
expense while it is not being incurred, without ob-
taining a modification of the child support order. 1990 
78-45-7.17. Child care costs. 
(1) The need to include child care costs in the child 
support order is presumed if the custodial parent is 
working and actually incurring the child care costs. 
(2) The need to include child care costs is not pre-
sumed, but may be awarded on a case by case basis if 
OPERATION OF THE COURTS 
(ii) duration and depth of desire for custody; 
(iii) ability to provide personal rather than surrogate care; 
(IV) significant impairment of ability to function as a parent 
through drug abuse, excessive drinking or other causes; 
(v) reasons for having relinquished custody in the past; 
(vi) religious compatibility with the child; 
(vii) kinship, including in extraordinary circumstances stepparent 
status; 
(viii) financial condition; 
(F) any other factors deemed important by the evaluator, the parties, 
or the court. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
A>«ALYSIS mit a written report to the court, thereby con-
templating the use of such a report by a trial 
Use of evaluator's report court in child custod\ determinations Linam 
Cited v King, 804 P 2d 1235 (Utah Ct App 1991) 
Use of evaluator's report Cited in Merriam \ Merriam 799 P 2d 1172 
SubdiMsion (2) permits an evaluator to sub- (Utah Ct App 1990) 
Rule 4-904. Repealed. 
Repeals . — Rule 4-904. providing for the 
promulgation of child support guidelines, was 
repealed in 1989 
Rule 4-905. Domestic pretrial conferences and orders. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for conducting pretrial conferences in 
contested domestic matters. 
To provide for uniformity in pretrial orders in contested domestic matters. 
Applicabili ty: 
This rule shall apply to the district courts which have court commissioners. 
S ta tement of the Rule: 
(1) Court commissioners shall conduct pretrial conferences in all contested 
matters seeking divorce, annulment, paternity or modification of a decree of 
divorce. 
(2) At the pretrial conference, the commissioner shall discuss the issues 
with counsel and the parties, may receive proffers of evidence, and may re-
ceive evidence if authorized to do so by the presiding district judge. 
(3) Following the pretrial conference, the commissioner shall issue a pre-
trial order which shall include: 
(A) the issues stipulated to by the parties; 
(B) the issues which remain in dispute; and 
(C) the commissioner's recommendations as to the disputed issues. 
(4) The commissioner may designate one of the parties' counsel to reduce 
the pretrial order to writing pursuant to Rule 4-504. 
993 
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(5) The disputed issues identified in the pretrial order shall remain at issue 
for purposes of trial. 
(Added effective March 31, 1992.) 
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